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CONFUCIUS AND THE CHINESE LEGAL
TRADITION
Chenglin Liu*
More than two thousand years ago, Confucius transformed and
perfected an institution for governing Chinese people, which has been
religiously replicated by subsequent dynasties. Within the Confucian
institution, the King, at the pinnacle of the pyramid, held absolute
authority; regional lords were loyal to the King; and commoners were
submissive to the privileged. Confucius held that peace and order could
only be achieved when people acted according to their hierarchical worth
assigned by the ruler. This article offers an overview of the
transformation of Confucianism. It then examines competing schools of
thought-Legalism and Taoism-and explains why Confucianism
triumphed to become the official Chinese ideology. Through a series of
case studies, the article theorizes that the central theme of Confucian-
inspired laws was perpetuation of inequality. With the declining
influence of Marxism, the Communist Party has revived the Confucian
tradition to maintain its legitimacy and project its "soft power" to the
world. This article concludes that, against the massive weight of tradition
deeply ingrained in the people's minds and souls, the rule of law and
equality will unlikely be an important force in China.
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. I would like to
express my sincere thanks to my colleagues Michael Ariens and Vincent Johnson for
their valuable comments. Ernest White, Annie Bright, Dominic Castillo, and Ricardo
Ruiz provided excellent assistance in improving the draft of this article in numerous
ways, for which I am grateful. I would also like to thank the editors of the Michigan State
International Law Review for their superb work verifying the voluminous sources both in
English and Chinese cited throughout this article.
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Confucius and the Chinese Legal Tradition
1. INTRODUCTION
When Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China (PRC)
in 1949, he solemnly declared that the new nation was no longer saddled
with the "three mountains"-feudalism, imperialism, and bureaucrat-
capitalism.1 By embracing Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology,
the new nation severed ties with the traditional cultures and institutions,
which had lasted for thousands of years. Mao poetically described the
new nation as a clean canvas on which he would "compose the most
elegant lyrics and draw the most beautiful pictures."3 As a pragmatist,
Mao not only offered an inspiring image of the future but also made it
clear that the Confucian tradition would never return to compete with
Communism.
4
The mass campaigns for the destruction and elimination of the
Chinese tradition began at the inception of the new republic and reached
its climax during the Cultural Revolution.5 One of the objectives of the
Cultural Revolution "was to wipe out the 'four olds'-old customs, old
culture, old habits, and old ideas."6 The most violent act took place at
Qufu, where the Red Guards desecrated Confucius's tomb, destroyed his
temples, and dismembered his statues. They also defaced and smashed
numerous stone carvings inscribed with calligraphy by emperors and
1. Chinese People are Marching Towards Bright Future, 43 PEKING REV. 24, 25
(1968), https ://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1968/PRI 968-431.htim.
2. See Tillman Durdin, China Transformed by Elimination of 'Four Olds', N.Y.
TIWES (May 19, 1971), https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/19/archives/china-
transformed-by-elimination-of-four-olds.html (discussing the origins of the "Cultural
Revolution in China").
3. MAO ZEDONG JIESHAO YIGE HEZOU (Jh -- <ff)
[INTRODUCING A CO-OPERATIVE], 2 (1975).
4. See generally A. James Gregor & Maria Hsia Chang, Anti-Confucianism:
Mao's Last Campaign, 19 ASIAN SURVEY 1073 (1979).
5. Durdin, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. Zhang Shunqing ( J ill), Tan Houlan Qufu "Taokong" Jishi (i' ± --
&A"- [A Factual Record of How Tan Houlan Laid Siege to Qufu], YANHUANG
CHUNQIU, 2015, at 19, 19. See also Zhang Shunqing ( Jli ), The Documentary of Tan
Houlan's Qufu "Discussion Hole", http://www.yhcqw.com/34/9756.hnil (last visited
Apr. 6, 2020).
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scholars from various dynasties praising Confucius.' Residents looted
Confucius's temples and tombs for artifacts and archives.9 The most
culturally insulting transgression perpetrated by the Red Guards occurred
when they publicly exhumed and mutilated the body of Confucius's 76th
generation descendant.10 By resorting to these extreme measures, the
Red Guards hoped to eradicate Confucius's influence once and for all.11
However, uprooting a tradition deeply ingrained in the people's minds
and souls for thousands of years was not as simple as Mao believed.
12
From generation to generation, people subconsciously carried on the
Confucian tradition.13 With the passing of the old generation of leaders
and the declining influence of Communism, Chinese political leadership
has recently made a deliberate ffort to revive the Confucian tradition in
hopes of solidifying public support for the government and maintaining
its legitimacy.14 The leadership has also openly embraced the Confucian
spirit in an attempt to solve the thorny social issues caused by rapid
economic expansion.15 There is no clearer official endorsement of the
Chinese tradition than President Xi's signature agenda, which calls for
building "a Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation."16
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Liu Yanxun, Kongzi My Mengnan Ji [How Confucius's Tomb Was
Destroyed], ZHONGGUO XINWEN ZHOUKAN [CHINA NEWSWEEK], Mar. 15, 2010, at 80, 80.
11. Sang Ye & Geremie R. Barmd, Commemorating Confucius in 1966-67: The




12. See Evan Osnos, Confucius Comes Home: Move Over, Mao, NEW YORKER
(Jan. 5, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/13/confucius-comes-
home.
13. See MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD 273 (2009)
("Whatever democratic political system evolves in China will bear the heavy imprint of
its Confucian past.").
14. See Jeremy Page, Why China is Turning Back to Confucius, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 20, 2015, 9:00 AM EDT), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-china-is-tuning-
back-to-confucius- 1442754000.
15. Id. ("Mao doesn't sell. Communism doesn't sell. But Confucianism and other
traditional thinking can make sense.").
16. See Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Report
at the 19th CPC National Congress (Oct. 18, 2017).
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It took fifty years for Chinese authorities to reverse course-from
digging up Confucius's tombs to promoting Confucius both at home and
abroad.1" The half-century anti-Confucius detour was only a brief hiatus
in a two-thousand-year-old tradition. While the "Confucius" that the
Chinese government identifies with may not be the "Confucius" of the
past, it is a winning strategy for the government to project its "soft
power" through Confucius's enduring legacy and publicity, especially on
the world stage.18 The government has established more than 500
Confucius Institutes all over the world, some of which are on American
university campuses.9 So far, the government has enlisted "Confucius"
as an agent for both marketing socialist values internationally and
rekindling nationalism at home.20
Confucianism is a multifaceted institution that does not lend itself to a
clear definition. Historically, Confucianism advocated benevolent
governance but also held that a harmonious society could only be
achieved when people acted according to their hierarchical worth
assigned by the patriarch.21 It required absolute submission from the
inferior to the superior.22 Confucianism promoted learning, but limited
study to the classics edited by Confucius.23 It encouraged self-cultivation
and self-fulfillment, but one needed to keep one's thoughts within the
realm of Confucian teachings.24  The official creed could not be
17. See ANNPING CHIN, THE AUTHENTIC CONFUCIUS: A LIFE OF THOUGHT AND
POLITICS 11-12 (2007) (discussing the slow reintegration of Confucianism in the culture).
18. James F. Paradise, China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius
Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power, 49 ASIAN SURVEY 647, 648 (2009).
19. The Confucius Institute, U. NEBRASKA-LINCOLN,
https://confuciusinstitute.unl.edu/about-us-0 (last visited Jan. 31, 2020).
20. See Eleanor Albert, China's Big Bet on Soft Power, COUNCIS ON FOREIGN
REL. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-big-bet-soft-power. See
also Nicholas J.S. Miller, Pragmatic Nationalism and Confucianism: The New Ideology
of the CCP, 2 INQUIRIES 1, 23, 32-36, 38 (2010),
http://www.inquiriesjoumal.com/articles/229/pragmatic-nationalism-and-confucianism-
the-new-ideology-of-the-ccp.
21. See CHIN, supra note 17, at 167-69.
22. See T'UNG-TSu CH'U, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 239 (1965).
23. Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy 191 (1948) (stating
that Tung Chung-Shu was "instrumental in making Confucianism the orthodox belief of
the Han Dynasty, at the expense of other schools of thought.").
24. Id. at 191-92.
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challenged in any way25 Throughout history, intellectuals who
attempted to deviate from the orthodox teachings and experiment with
free-thinking, even inadvertently, faced jail terms or the death penalty.6
Circumventing official censorship was a grave crime punishable by
death.7  The Confucian tradition attached great importance to family
values and responsibilities, but it often imposed unbearable burdens on
family members.2 If a person committed one of the abominable crimes,
such as treason or blasphemy, his relatives within nine degrees faced
extermination by the death penalty or exile.
29
Confucian values are manifested in various aspects of current Chinese
law.3' For example, according to a new provision recently added to the
Elderly Protection Law (EPL), failure to visit one's parents is illegal.31
The law also obligates companies to grant leaves of absence for
employees to visit their aging parents to fulfill their legal duties.32 As
natural caretakers of their elderly parents, adult children are required to
provide adequate physical and mental assistance to their parents.3 3
Children cannot avoid their legal duty to care for their parents by
25. See generally Guo CHENGKANG (qjZJA) & LIN TIEJUN (4I) ), QINGCHAO
WENZIYU (MPiZrl)i) [THE LITERARY INQUISITION IN TE QING DYNASTY] 3, 7-8
(1990).
26. Id.
27. CHIN, supra note 17, at 158.
28. SIMA QIAN (A t ,i), SHIJI (-41.) [HISTORICAL RECORD] 139 (1959). The
following account is mainly based on Sima Qian's work supplemented by modern
biographers' findings. This article cites the version by SIMA QIAN (In -1  LT), SHIJI (W,)
[HISTORICAL RECORD] (Tian Wen (iZ%) trans. 2016) [hereinafter Wen].
29. Id.
30. See generally Du Yimei, Rujia Sixiang Dui Dangdai Zhonggua Fazhi
Wenhua de Yingxiang [Confucian Influence on Modern Chinese Law], TAIYUAN
CHENGSHI ZHIYE JISHU XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. OF TAIYUAN URB. VOCATIONAL C.] 2011.
See also Cheng Jishan (V it Lt), "Xiaodao: "Xuyao Falv Lai Baohu? (" jwo": ,
i~j )ifP2} [Filial Piety. In Need of the Protection of Law?], INST. OF L.,
http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showNews.asp?id=9381 (last visited Jan. 30, 2020).
31. Laonian Ren Quanyi Baozhang Fa (-tlf- [Law on Protection
of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Dec. 29, 2018, effective Dec. 29, 2018), art. 18, 2019 STANDING COMM.
NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. 167 (China).
32. Id.
33. Id. art. 14.
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relinquishing their inheritance .3 Under Chinese estate law, children who
have failed to care for their parents have no right to receive a share of
their parents' estates.35 Those who have lived with and cared for their
parents receive a larger share of the estates than those who have not
fulfilled their familial duties.
36
The Chinese government often utilizes family collective
responsibility, a hallmark of traditional law, to achieve its particular
goals. During the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, thousands of
schoolchildren died because poorly constructed school buildings
collapsed.37 A group of parents planned to protest the government for its
failure to hold the developers of the shoddy buildings accountable.38
Fearing that a full investigation could reveal official corruption and cause
social unrest, the government directed the local police to apprehend the
leader of the planned protest.39 To maximize the pressure on the fleeing
leader, the police arrested his relatives along with his eight-year-old
son.40  Similarly, the government recently detained two American
citizens, Victor and Cynthia Liu, who were visiting their ailing
grandparents in China.41  The government defended the action by
claiming that the two siblings' father was a fugitive living in the United
States.42 By detaining his children, the government intended to force the
father to return to China to face an ongoing criminal investigation. There
34. Id. art. 19.
35. Jicheng Fa ( lt;4) [Law of Succession], (promulgated by the Nat'l
People's Cong., Apr. 10, 1984, effective Oct. 1, 1985), art. 13, 1985 FAGUi HUIBIAN 18
(China).
36. Id.
37. See Chenglin Liu, Socialized Liability in Chinese Tort Law, 59 HARVARD
INT'L L. J. 16, 40-41 (2018), https://harvardilj.org/2018/03/understanding-socialized-
liability-under-chinese-tort-law/.
38. See id. at 42.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Jennifer Hansler, Young American Held in China Makes Plea to Come Home,
CNN (May 9, 2019, 3:35 PM EDT), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/09/politics/cynthia-
liu-plea/index.htil.
42. Id.
Michigan State International Law Review
is no evidence that the two children were involved in their father's
alleged crime.
4 3
This Article first offers an overview of both the Zhou Dynasty-
during which Confucius lived-and the transformation of Confucianism.
Then it examines competing schools of thought, Legalism and Taoism,
and explains why Confucianism triumphed to become official Chinese
ideology. It subsequently explores the influence of Confucianism on the
legal tradition. Confucius did not think the law was an indispensable
institution, rather merely a last resort when moral teachings failed.44
Rulers of later dynasties codified Confucius's teaching into law, which
included the death penalty for violation of the Confucian norms.45
Through a series of case studies, this Article provides a detailed analysis
of family relations and inequality before the law-two key concepts of
Confucianism, which heavily influenced the Chinese legal tradition.
This Article concludes with an assessment of Confucius's life and his
legacy, many aspects of which endure today.
2. THE DYNASTIC CYCLE
About 4,000 years ago, China began its civilization,46 producing "the
longest and the most continuous historical record[s] of any existing
nation. " 47 These records show a clear pattern of dynastic cycles that
punctuated Chinese history.48 Despite the sacrifices that accompanied
43. See Edward Wong & Michael Forsythe, China's Tactic to Catch a Fugitive
Official: Hold His Two American Children, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2018),
https ://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/25/us/politics/china-exit-ban.html.
44. See JAMES LEGGE, THE LIFE AND TEACHINGS OF CONFUCIUS WITH
EXPLANATORY NOTES 122 (1867) [hereinafter CONFUCIUS ANALECTS].
45. See infra p. 45.
46. Milton W. Meyer, China: A Concise History 23 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that
Xia, the first Chinese dynasty, ruled either from 22501-1766 B.C. or 1994-1523 B.C.).
See also WANG HANCHANG & LIN DAIZHAO, ZHONGGUO GUDAI ZHENGZHI ZHIDU SHILUE
[A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF ANCIENT CHINA] 1 (1985) (citing Mao
Zedong that the Chinese history dated back to 4,000 years ago.).
47. Walter T. Swingle, Chinese Historical Sources, 26 AM. HIST. REV. 717, 717
(1921).
48. See PETER C. PERDUE, CHINA MARCHES WEST: THE QING CONQUEST OF
CENTRAL EURASIA 6 (2005). See also EILEEN H. TAMURA ET AL., CHINA: UNDERSTANDING
ITS PAST 127 (1997). See generally FREDERIC WAKEMAN, JR., THE FALL OF IMPERIAL
CHINA 55-70 (1975).
[Vol. 28.3
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the establishment of a new reign, each dynasty failed almost in the same
way as did its predecessor.4 9 It began with a courageous leader who led a
rebellion to overthrow a corrupt dynasty ruled by an incompetent
emperor.5 To justify the uprising, the leader would make his followers
believe that the emperor had lost he Mandate of Heaven to rule the
country.5' The leader would then declare himself emperor, and begin a
new dynasty.52 In the beginning, the new emperor would abolish harsh
laws, reduce taxes, revive the economy, and achieve a period of
prosperity.53 Several generations into the dynasty, the successors became
reluctant to carry out their founding emperor's policies.54 Instead of
maintaining a benevolent way of governance, they would increase taxes,
impose draconian laws, and persecute intellectuals.55  In the end,
rebellions would break out.56  Any emergencies, such as foreign
invasions or natural disasters, would push the already weakened dynasty
to its breaking point.57 Later, another ambitious leader would emerge
and start a new cycle.
58
3. THE ZHOU DYNASTY
The Zhou Dynasty holds a special place in the study of Chinese legal
history not only because Confucius lived then, but also because the major
legal principles of traditional Chinese law took shape during that time.
The Duke of Zhou first articulated the theory of benevolent governance,
which became a basis for Confucianism and a model for subsequent
dynasties.6" After drawing lessons from the failures of the previous
49. TAMURA ET AL., supra note 48, at 127.
50. Id.
51. See WAKEMAN, JR., SUPRA NOTE 48.





57. See WAKEMAN, JR., SUPRA NOTE 48.
58. See J.M. ROBERTS & O.A WESTAD, TE PENGUIN HISTORY OF THE WORLD
130-31 (2013).
59. See MA XIAOHONG (- 1j4'), ZHONGGUO GUDAI FALV SHIXIANG SHI (I' [
ft M*,4) [HISTORY OF ANCIENT CHINA'S LEGAL THOUGHTS] 24-27 (2004).
60. Id. at 27.
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dynasties, the Duke warned that when a king fell from the favor of
Heaven, he would lose the mandate to govern the country.61 To stay in
Heaven's grace, a king must feel compassion for people's living
conditions, especially for the widowed, orphaned, and disabled.62 The
Duke advised that the king must use punishment as a last resort and
administer the law judiciously to avoid harming innocent people.
63
Those who committed crimes should have a chance to modify their
behaviors before sanctioned with penalties.
64
The king was expected to set an example for his subjects by fulfilling
his fiduciary duty to Heaven with utmost care.65  To maintain full
support, the king must treat royal relatives and nobilities (the privileged
class) differently from commoners.66 The privileged should not be
subject to harsh criminal penalties except in egregious cases.67 The
principle of inequality before the law was well summarized as the
following: "[the] rules of polite behavior (i) do not reach down to the
common people; the punishments (hsing) do not reach up to the great
dignitaries. '6  Subsequent dynasties codified the principle of inequality
in the penal code to exempt the privileged class from the legal system.
69
Therefore, the dynastic governance, including the legal system that
matured in the Qin Dynasty, remained in its original form without
substantial changes.7
a. The Origin of the Zhou Dynasty
The origin of the Zhou people is uncertain.1 While some speculate
that the Zhou tribe was from the western frontier of the Shang Dynasty, 72
61. Id. at24-25.
62. Id. at 25.
63. Id. at 25-26.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 25.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Derk Bodde & Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China Exemplified by 190
Ch'ing Dynasty Cases 23 (1973).
69. See The Great Qing Code 36 (WILLIAM C. JONES ET AL. TRANS., 1994); The
T'ang Code 83 (WALLACE JOHNSON TRANS., 1997).
70. See A.F.P HULSEWE, REMNANTS OF HAN LAW 7 (1955).
71. J.A.G. Roberts, A Concise History of China 7 (1999).
72. Id.
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others believe that the Zhou tribe migrated from the central plain of
present-day Shanxi province.7 Mencius once called the Zhou King "a
man of the western barbarians," a derogatory term for people who were
not culturally Chinese.4
Historians attribute the emergence and survival of the Zhou tribe to its
openness and adaptive nature. The Zhou people were receptive to people
of different cultures and beliefsi5  Through interacting with proto-
Tibetan Qiang people, Zhou rulers built a strong coalition, which set the
basis for its subsequent expansion.6 By the 12th century B.C., the Zhou
tribe settled in the Wei valley, to the west of present-day Xi'an. The
Zhou people learned the culture and administrative skills from the Shang
Dynasty and eventually became its vassals.8
In 1045 B.C., King Wu, the Zhou King, commanded 45,000 troops
and waged an attack on the Shang.79  Even though the Shang sent
700,000 men to battle, it suffered a total defeat because many refused to
fight for the Shang King, who was cruel and oppressive to his people.8"
Unwilling to confront the humiliation, the Shang King committed suicide
by setting himself on fire, marking the end of the Shang Dynasty.81
b. Mandate of Heaven
Conquering a nation is one thing but asserting sovereignty over that
nation is quite another. Following the surprise victory in 1045 B.C., the
Zhou King12 was anxious about how to govern the Shang people, who
73. The Cambridge History of Ancient China-From the Origins of Civilization
to 221 B.C., at 303 (Michael Loewe & Edward L. Shaughnessy eds., 1999) [hereinafter A
Cambridge History].
74. Herrlee G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China 59 (1970).




79. A Cambridge History, supra note 73, at 309.
80. CREEL, supra note 74, at 57.
81. The History of the Zhou Dynasty, SUTORI, https://www.sutori.com/item/di-
xin-was-the-last-king-of-the-shang-dynasty-1075-1046bce-in-his-early-year (l st visited
Mar. 7, 2020).
82. See TONY JAQUES, DICTIONARY OF BATTLES AND SIEGES: A GUDE
TO 8,500 BATTLES FROM ANTIQUITY THOUGH THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 700 (2007).
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were advanced in culture and tradition.3 Despite the conquest, he
Shang people still regarded the Zhou as an uncivilized tribe incapable of
replacing the Shang." In response, the Zhou King offered an ingenious
argument, purportedly made for the first time in Chinese history.5 It was
Heaven's intention that made the Zhou unstoppable in its conquest
because the Shang King had already lost the Mandate of Heaven and the
Zhou King merely acted upon Heaven's direction to save the Shang
people from their oppressive King.86 Therefore, the conquest was not a
predatory act, but a "benevolent undertaking" to rescue the people in
misery. With the Mandate of Heaven bestowed onto the Zhou King, it
was legitimate for him to rule the Shang people.88 Thereafter, the Zhou
Kings called themselves tyanzi, or Son of Heaven, which was used by all
subsequent emperors until the fall of Qing in 1912.89
The doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven was not just a propaganda tool
for the conqueror to justify a new regime. It also imposed enormous
responsibility on the ruler to hold onto the Mandate. Realizing the
boundless anxiety that the Mandate brought to the King,9" the Duke of
Zhou warned that if the King failed to respect Heaven, he would lose the
Mandate the same way as did the Shang King did.91 It seemed that the
King's focus was on Heaven, but his true focus was on the people.92 The
reactions of the people were the bellwether for the King to judge the
mood of Heaven. Therefore, King Wu claimed, "[m]en should not
mirror themselves in water, but in the people . . . I am concerned only
about Heaven and people.,93 While there is not an exhaustive list of
duties for a King to fulfill, he must avoid the following:
1. Failure to punish crimes and demonstrate clemency;
83. Shang Dynasty China's First Recorded History, U.S. HISTORY,
https://www.ushistory.org/CIV/9B.ASP (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
84. See id. at 60.
85. Id. at 82 ("We cannot tell how early the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven
was in existence, but it is mentioned repeatedly in the speeches of King Wu.").
86. See id.
87. Id. at 85.
88. Id. at 84.
89. See FRANK M. FLANAGAN, CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS AND WESTERN
EDUCATION 115 (2011).
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2. Failure to show respect for god and ancestors;
3. Failure to treat the tasks of government with respect;
4. Failure to stay sober;
5. Failure to promote the welfare of the people. 94
In the Han Dynasty, Confucians refined the doctrine of the Mandate
of Heaven based on the Yin-Yang theory.95  The signs of losing the
Mandate included natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, famine,
and droughts.96
c. Enfeoffment
Following its sudden military victory, the Zhou King urgently needed
to exert effective control over the vast land once ruled by the Shang, and
pacify the wrath of the Shang people, who deemed the Zhou people as
rustic and "without culture."97 King Wu sent royal relatives to defend
various strategic regions across the country.98 In addition, the King
permitted the son of the Shang King to become a vassal to "continue the
sacrifices to the Shang Kings." 99 By doing so, the Zhou King intended to
portray himself as a benevolent ruler to ease tensions with the Shang
people.1"' During this process, Zhou invented a set of rules to govern the
relationships between the King and the newly enfeoffed lords.101
94. See id. at 94-97 (discussing the various duties that a King should not avoid
when serving the people).
95. Yu-LAN, supra note 23, at 192.
96. Id. at 198.
97. CREEL, supra note 74, at 60, 70.
98. A Cambridge History, supra note 73, at 311.
99. CREEL, supra note 74, at 70.
100. Id.
101. CHIN, supra note 17, at 43. Professor Annping Chin recreated the scene of a
typical enfeoffment ceremony:
Whenever [the Zhou King] appointed a member of the imperial family to create a colony
elsewhere, they would hold an audience in the capital, and the ceremony that followed
would include a feast and libation, and a display of archery. Court scribes would be
present on such occasions. They would prepare a record of the royal command and of the
words exchanged, and they would include a description of the rituals. At the conclusion
of the investiture, the conferee would depart with a copy of the record, and often he
would have it inscribed on a bronze vessel to commemorate this important moment in his
life. Id.
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Following the royal order, the enfeoffed lords established various
states across the country.10 2 One such state was Lu, which was founded
by Duke Zhou's elder son.10 3 Five-hundred years later, Confucius was
born in the State of Lu. Confucius was proud of being a cultural
descendant of the Duke of Zhou, whom he admired for his bravery,
integrity, and wisdom.104 At the end of his life, Confucius sighed,
"Extreme is my decay. For a long time, I have not dreamed ... that I saw
the duke of Chow.,
105
d. The Fall of the Feudal Order and Confucius's Ideals
Even though the Zhou Dynasty lasted 800-900 years, the longest
dynasty in Chinese history,106 it did not exert actual control over the
enfeoffed states for a large part of its reign.107 The states were far away
from the King and the communication between the King and his subjects
was sparse.108 According to the enfeoffment covenants, the states were
obligated to be loyal to the King and to come to the dynasty's defense
when called for. 109
In the beginning, the enfeoffed lords identified themselves as part of
Zhou; thus, they had a sense of duty to the dynasty.110 However, as time
went by both the legal bonds and consanguineous ties to the King faded
102. See A CAMBRIDGE HISTORY, supra note 73, at 311-12, for a complete list of
states established by enfeoffed lords.
103. Yang Chaoming (fij#A), Kongzi "Mlveng Zhougong" de Lishi Jiedu
Kongzi Yanjiu Yuan, Jining Ribao She Lianhe Juban "Chunqiu Jiangtan " Zhailu (fL "
0AM '0, V [Historical Interpretation of Confucius's "Dreaming of Duke of
Zhou " An Excerpt from "Chunqiu Forum " Jointly Hosted by the Institute of Confucius
and Jining Daily], JININGRIBAO [JININGDAILY], May 13, 2011.
104. Id.
105. CONFUCIUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 196.
106. Meyer, supra note 46, at 129 (stating the Zhou Dynasty lasted from 1122 or
1027-221 B.C.).
107. Id. at 130 ("[The Zhou] kings reigned but did not rule.").
108. Id. at 129 ("[B]ecause of extended periods of warfare and the existence of
strong city-states, the central authority was often only a hollow name.").
109. Qizhi Zhang, An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture 141 (2015).
110. CREEL, supra note 74, at 100. "At the beginning of Western Chou, feudalism
... was a new institution. The feudal lords were instruments of the King; they had not yet
achieved a degree of independence that could impair the essentially centralized character
of the government."
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away.111 At the same time, the states grew both in size and wealth due to
the development of agricultural techniques, commercial transactions, and
administrative measures. 1 1 2 The lords of younger generations no longer
felt the same attachment to the King as did their predecessors. The lords
viewed their states as their sovereign territories and saw no obligation to
the King sitting afar.113
Within each state, the same pattern continued. The state lord sub-
enfeoffed cities and towns to his close relatives.114  After several
generations, the sub-enfeoffed relatives-also called hereditary
families-grew independent from the lord.115 Thus, they lost their sense
of loyalty and respect for the lord of the states. In the State of Lu, for
example, each of the three hereditary families had a fortified city of its
own.116 Each family had a strong army that only answered to the
hereditary lord. 7 Most of the state's wealth was concentrated within the
three families. 8 Furthermore, the three families controlled the state's
political, social, and military affairs. 9
During Confucius's lifetime, the feudal system established by the
Zhou King began to unravel.120 Conflicts developed not only between
states and the Zhou King but also among states themselves.1 2 1 Within
each state, the tension between the lords and the hereditary families was
111. Chin, supra note 17, at 43-44.
112. BODDE &MORRIS, supra note 68, at 15-16.
113. Meyer, supra note 46, at 130 ("[K]ings reigned, but did not rule. The
aristocracy became more independent and in the continual wars and strife, feudalism
rose. Monarchs were manipulated by a league of vassals headed by an overlord.").
114. See Chin, supra note 17, at 50 (discussing how the descendants of Zhou were
the rulers of Lu starting with the son of the Duke of Zhou who was first enfeoffed).
115. Id. Confucius was concerned about the growing power of the hereditary
families. Id. ("'Their wealth [the hereditary family's wealth] is greater than that of [the
descendants of] the Duke of Zhou'; 'They have eight rows of eight dancers, [sixty-four in
all,] to perform in their courtyard. If this can be tolerated, what cannot be tolerated?.')."
116. See id. at 29 (discussing the rebel attacks on the cities controlled by the
hereditary families).
117. See id.
118. See id. at 28-30.
119. See id. at 42-43.
120. See id. at 47.
121. See id. at 49-50.
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equally intense. Confucius's time was a period of disorder and
struggle.123
What Confucius envisioned was far divorced from the reality he lived
in. He vividly described a utopia, which he firmly believed to have
existed during the peak of the Zhou Dynasty:
When the rule of propriety prevailed, the power belonged to all people.
The able and talented administrated state affairs. People were sincere
and friendly to each other. They treated other people's parents and
children with the same love and affection as they did their own. The
elderly had abundant resources to enjoy their lives until death. Young
people had the means to live up to their full potential. The able-bodied
retained employment. The widowed, orphaned, and disabled were
treated with kindness and compassion and provided with adequate
support. While men worked outside, women kept homes in order.
People strived to harness natural resources not for their own profits, but
for the common good. Since there were no conspiracies, rebellions,
thefts, or any other crimes, people did not lock their doors at night. It
was a world in unity. 121
Confucius prescribed the path to realizing the harmonious society he
conjured: people must restrain themselves and return to the rites of Zhou
( keji fuli ori E k L).121 'To subdue one's self and return to propriety,
is perfect virtue. If a man can for one day subdue himself and return to
propriety, all under heaven will ascribe perfect virtue to him. 126 When
people restrained themselves and acted upon the rule of propriety, the
world would be in the right order just like the early Zhou experienced-
the King at the pinnacle of the social pyramid held the absolute authority;
regional lords demonstrated utmost respect for and loyalty to the King;
hereditary families within each state were subordinate to the state lords;
and commoners were submissive to the nobles.
127
122. See id. at 28-30.
123. See id. at 42-43.
124. SUN XIDAN, LiI JIJE [ANNOTATED BOOK OF RITES] 581-83 (Shen Xiaohuan &
Wang Xingxian eds., 1989).
125. CHIN, supra note 17, at 167.
126. CONFUCIUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 250.
127. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 15.
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4. THE LIFE OF CONFUCIUS
128
Confucius was born in 551 B.C. in the State of Lu, southwest of
modern-day Shandong Province in China.129 His ancestry traced back to
the King of Song, a state in the Spring and Autumn period.130 The birth
of Confucius was a result of his father's second marriage with a young
woman from the Yan family. 131 When Confucius was three, his father
died.1 32  Since an early age, Confucius demonstrated a keen interest in
learning rules of proper conduct for sacrificial offerings.
133
When Confucius was seventeen years old, Baron Meng Li of the State
of Lu was near the end of his life. 134 The Baron praised Confucius for his
noble roots and his ancestors' humble character, and contribution to the
128. There have been numerous versions of biographical sketches for Confucius
during the past two millennia. Historians generally agree that Confucius's biography in
Sima Qian's Shiji may be more reliable than others. See Wen, supra note 28, at 139.
Supplemental recourses include JAMES LEGGE, THE CHINESE CLASSICS: WITH A
TRANSLATION, CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL NOTES, PROLEGOMENA, AND COPIOUS INDEXES
(1861); Su WANG (T41), KONGZI JIAYU (TL#iM-) [FAMILY SAYINGS OF CONFUCIJS]
(There have been numerous editions of this book. The sources that this article relied is
from the edition by Deing Wang (ITf ), KONGZI JIAYU YIZHU (TL#i - )
[ANNOTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF FAMILY SAYINGS OF CONFUCIJS] (1998)
[hereinafter KJ 1998].
129. Wen, supra note 28, at 139.
130. Id. at 139, 141. The period started in 771 B.C. and ended in 476 B.C. See The
Warring States Period in China (475-221 BC), CHINA HIGHLIGHTS,
https ://www.chinahighights.contravelguide/china-history/warring-states-period.htm
(last visited Mar. 18, 2020) [hereinafter The Warring States Period].
131. Id. at 139. Sima Qian used the word "Tf '", which means engaging an
intercourse in the wild. See id. Legge offered a more elaborated account about
Confucius's birth: Confucius's father Shuh-leang Heih married twice. During his first
marriage, his wife bore him only nine daughters. A concubine finally gave him a crippled
son. Already in his 70s, Shuh-leang Heih sought a second marriage in the Yan's family,
which had three daughters, the youngest being Ching-tsae who become his wife and gave
birth to Confucius. LEGGE, supra note 128, at 58.
132. Wen, supra note 28, at 140. See also, QIAN Mu (0#), AI f/ [BIOGRAPHY
OF CONFUCIUS] (2002).
133. Id. at 140. By adding the details about Confucius children, Sima Qian
probably wanted to show that Confucius was precocious in understanding, "Li" the ritual
that became the center piece of Confucianism. Li [Ritual Propriety], KURTIS HAGEN,
https://kurtishagen.com/confucianism/lii/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2020) (discussing how one
should "act with attention and care characteristic of the performance of a sacred rite").
134. Id. at 141.
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State of Song.135 He prophesied that Confucius would be a magnificent
scholar and asked his son to study Chinese classics with him. 136 Either
because of the Baron's prediction or his promotion, Confucius was soon
put in charge of a local granary.137 He managed the granary successfully,
setting an example for other managers.13' Then, Confucius catapulted
into stardom in Lu's political circle. In a few years, Confucius
experienced a meteoric rise in his political career from being the Minister
of Construction to the Minister of Justice, and then acting Prime
Minister.
139
During his tenure as an acting Prime Minister, Confucius quickly
restored peace and order to Lu: marketers no longer swindled shoppers,
men and women took separate roads in public (the social norm at the
time), crime disappeared, and people received foreign guests warmly at
their homes without a request from the State.140
With Confucius's increasing role in the state affairs of Lu, the Duke
of Qi, a rival neighbor of Lu, was concerned that Confucius would make
Lu a strong state and conquer Qi in the future.14 The Duke of Qi invited
the Duke of Lu to negotiate a peace treaty in a valley on the border
between the two states.1 2 In fact, the invitation was Qi's ruse to kill the
Duke of Lu during the conference.1 3 The Duke of Lu naively believed
that Qi's invitation was a friendly overture, thus he did not plan to bring
his military entourage.144 Only upon Confucius's urging did the Duke
agree to bring his guards in case of emergency.
145
During the conference, the Duke of Qi entertained the guests from Lu
with a dance by a group of barbarians armed with sharp weapons.
14
1
When the men approached dangerously close to the Duke of Lu,
Confucius hurried to the stage of the meeting and exclaimed that the
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 143.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 143-148
140. Id. at 147-48.
141. Id. 143.
142. Id.
143. See id. At 143-44.
144. See id. at 143.
145. See id.
146. See id.
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armed barbarians dancing in front of Duke of Lu violated Li, the rule of
proper conduct that governed state relations.147 He requested that all the
barbarian dancers be evicted.148 The Duke of Qi was embarrassed that his
plot was foiled and ordered the evacuation of all the dancers.149 After the
encounter, the Duke of Qi was even more fearful of Confucius for his
wisdom and courage.15' To mend the rift, the Duke of Qi returned the
towns that he seized in previous battles back to Lu.
151
Under Confucius's tutelage, Lu became prosperous and peaceful.
152
The Duke of Qi once again felt threatened by the prospect that Lu would
soon prevail in the battle for hegemony among the warring states.153 To
avoid annihilation, the Duke of Qi sent 80 female dancers and 120 horses
as a gift to the Duke of Lu.154 Over Confucius's objection, the Duke of
Lu accepted the gift. 155 As the Duke of Lu indulged in the dancers, he
neglected his official duties.156 Thus, Confucius lost confidence in the
Duke of Lu and left the kingdom with his students.157 The Duke later
regretted that he alienated Confucius by refusing to follow his advice. 
158
Other sources offered a different account regarding the cause of
Confucius's exile,159 suggesting he was simply forced out of Lu after his
147. See id. Li governed individual conduct as well as international relations. The
peacetime and wartime 1i is analogous to today's international law. See Yu-LAN, supra
note 23, at 178.
148. Wen, supra note 28, at 143.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 144.
151. Id. Musheng Li gave a different account on Qi returning the seized territories
to Lu: At the end of the negotiation, Qi demanded Lu to contribute 300 chariots when Qi
was on a war with the enemy, LI MUSHENG, KONGZI ZHUAN (Kf *) [A BIOGRAPHY OF
CONFUCIUS] 104 (2016). Failure to do so, Lu would be in breach of the alliance treaty. Id.
Confucius realized that it was impractical for Lu to refuse the term because Qi was a
bigger state, but it was humiliating for Lu to accept it without having anything in return.
Id. He requested Qi to return the three towns that it seized during a previous war as a
condition for Lu to accept Qi's term. Id.
152. See Wen, supra note 28, at 147.






159. See CHIN, supra note 17, at 28-30.
496 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 28.3
failed attempt to curb the influence of the three hereditary families.
1 60
After gaining the high office at the Lu court, Confucius thought it was
time to mold Lu according to his ideals.161 In a perfect Confucian world,
the Duke is on the top of the hierarchical structure and everyone else is
submissive to the Duke.162 In reality, however, the three hereditary
families held the real political, economic, and military power of Lu.
163
They had their fortified cities to their own guarded by their own
troops.16' They defied the Duke's orders, appropriated the State financial
resources for their own use.165 The families demonstrated neither respect
for nor loyalty to the Duke.166 To change the status quo, Confucius
conspired with military strongmen to destroy the three families'
compounds and restore the Duke's supremacy, but his plot ended
disastrously.167 Confucius and his students had no choice but to flee Lu
for their lives.
168
Confucius roamed with his students from one state to another hoping
to be a state counselor, but he never managed to convince anyone to
apply his teaching.169 Some states respected him as a scholar, but they all
declined to appoint him to a key political post.170 Confucius once
complained that his talent was wasted lamenting, "[i]f there were any of
the princes who would employ me, in the course of twelve months, I
should have done something considerable. In three years, the government
160. See id.
161. CONFUCIUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 184 ("If any one employ me, may I
not make an eastern Chow [Zhou]?"). This passage revealed Confucius's goal was to
restore the hierarchical structure according to rule of propriety or "Li" See Yu-LAN,
supra note 23, at 178.
162. CONFUCIUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 184.




167. See id. at 30-31.
168. See id. at 28-30.
169. Id. at 91-92 (explaining that "[a]fter his return to Wei, Confucius became
anxious about finding a job there." And that "[H]e was desperate for a position in Duke
of Liang's government[.]").
170. Id. at 92 ("Why do you worry about [Confucius] not having an office? The
world has long been without a moral way. Heaven is about to use your master as the
wooden tongue for a bronze bell.").
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would be perfected.171 These states rejected Confucius because his
teaching set too high a moral bar for them to uphold.172 At the same time,
each individual state feared that their intimidating neighbors might retain
Confucius and make them even more threatening.173 To prevent giving
advantage to their rivals, one state plotted to besiege,174 or even
attempted to assassinate Confucius, albeit not successfully. 
171
Despite repeated rejections and occasional besieges, Confucius stayed
calm and focused on the study of classics during his arduous journey.
176
When his students asked him why he did not worry about his safety, he
replied, "If the Heaven ignores moral values, it would have its own way
to prohibit me from studying classics. [In fact], the Heaven promotes the
moral values, how can these hostile states bother me?177  Since the
Heaven allows me to study and bestows moral values to me, why should
I be [worried] about these attacks?,178 Finally, Confucius went back to
Lu after fourteen years of exile.179 No longer interested in working for
the Duke of Lu, Confucius devoted his heart and soul to teaching and
editing classics, until his death in 479 B.C.18
a. The Case of Shaozheng Mao
Confucius's biographical sketch in Shiji, the Historical Record, seems
impeccable. However, the biography omitted an event that Confucius's
followers have vigorously tried to deny as truth for thousands of years:
On his seventh day as the Minister of Justice, Confucius ordered the
171. CONFUCIUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 131.
172. See CHiN, supra note 17, at 89. For example, while seeking a job from the
State of Wei, he openly talked about the moral depravity of the Duke of Wei. Id.
173. Wen, supra note 28, at 156-57.
174. Id.
175. Id. When Confucius and his students were practicing rituals under a big tree,
an agent from the State of Song cut the tree. The falling tree trunk barely missed
Confucius. Id. Sima Qian did not say why the agent did not kill Confucius directly. Id. A
reasonable guess would be that no one wanted to bear the guilt for murdering the sage. Id.
If Confucius died as a result of a falling tree, the State of Song could claim it an accident
for which no one was responsible. Id.
176. See id. at 153.
177. Id. at 152-53.
178. Id. at 153.
179. Id. at 159.
180. Id. at 165-68, 172.
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execution of Shaozheng Mao for the crime of perverted speech. This
punishment was viewed as disproportionately severe even by
Confucius's contemporaries.181 When a student asked him if he regretted
his decision, Confucius replied:
Sit down, and I will tell you the reasons. Now there are five odious
predilections humans can possess, and robbing and thieving are not
amongst them. The first is having a penetrating but pernicious mind.
the second is being partial yet stubborn in conduct the third is speaking
falsehood and loving disputation. The fourth is having the capacity of a
fine memory but retaining only the bad and the ugly. The fifth is being
inclined to wrongdoing yet never short of justifications. A person with
just one of these tendencies would inevitably end up being executed by
a gentleman. Yet Shaozheng Mao had all five. Moreover, wherever he
happened to be residing, he had enough appeal to draw a crowd of
followers around him; and whenever he opened his mouth, he had
enough slickness to disguise his depraved nature and to hoodwink his
audience. This man was so powerful that when he turned right and
wrong on their heads, no one could call his bluff and bring him down.
He was a hero to petty men and so he had to be put to death. 
182
To justify Confucius's action, Xunzi cited seven early cases where
highly revered state counselors sentenced evil-minded men to death for
the same crime committed by Shaozheng Mao.11 3 One of them was Deng
Xi, who was a lawyer representing clients in their private interests.184 He
"charged his clients a long robe for a major case and a short robe for a
lesser one.""18  Zichan, the counselor of Zheng, accused Deng Xi of
being so driven by profit that he destroyed "any standard of right and
wrong." '186 One account vividly recorded how Deng Xi interfered with
the counselor's official functions:
In the state of Zheng, many people liked to post their writings [along
the main routes and byways]. Zichan ordered the posts to be stopped.
181. Wang Xianqian et al., Xunzi Jijie ( V# ) [XUNZI ANNOTAThD] 520
(1988).
182. See CHIN, supra note 17, at 156.
183. Id. at 157.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 158.
186. Id.
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Deng Xi began to pass out slips of his writings. Zichan again ordered it
to be stopped. Deng Xi then began to attach his writings to other things
he sent out. The infinite number of ordinances was matched by Deng
Xi's infinite number of attempts to circumvent them. 187
It was a crime for Deng Xi to argue against the government.188 It was
another crime for him to represent a client for profit as he argued against
the government.189 It was yet another, far more serious crime for him to
circumvent the government's "firewall" which was designed to censor
public opinions.19' If there had been a way, Zichan would have put Deng
Xi to death three times. Deng Xi caused confusion and sowed the seed
of discord.191 He would have been executed in any of the subsequent
dynasties. Therefore, the execution of Deng Xi did not in any way taint
Zichan's legacy as a righteous statesman because he did what any dutiful
state counselor would have done.192 In fact, the execution may have
contributed to his reputation as a diligent caretaker of the State's
interests.
Compared with Deng Xi, Shaozheng Mao was less culpable because
he did not obstruct State censorship. Yet, Confucius put him to death.
Imagine what would happen if a lawyer spoke to the media after making
a legal argument for his client in Confucius's court. The result would be
terrifying. Two millennia later, this fear persists.
193
187. Id.
188. See Zhao Jinkai (kXLNR), "Qiangu Guibian Diyi Ren" Dengxi ("E4
--A "A/17) [The Pioneer of Sophism, Dengxi], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO (A XV)
[PEOPLE'S CT. DAILY], June 22, 2018, sec. 5. See also ZHAO XIAOGENG (W5,94),
ZHONGGUA FAZHI SHI [HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM] (2004); Han Xing (OV),
Dengxi Yu Mingjia, Fajia (Y/J- " [Dengxi, School of Names, and
Legalism], SHAN'XI SHIFAN DAXUE JIXU JIAOYU XUEBAO ( l) ;@
TR) [J. OF FURTHER EDUC. OF SHAANXI NORMAL U.], Sept. 2006, at 32.
189. Zhao supra note 188.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See WANG DEMING (T1), KONGZI JIAYU YIZHU (h*-il- 4 1) [FAMILY
SAYINGS OF CONFUCIUS ANNOTATED] 163 (1998) (explaining how Confucius praised
Zichan's devotion to his home state).
193. SIDA LIu & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA: THE
POLITICS OF LAWYERS AT WORK 18 (2016) ("The legislative history of China's criminal
law dates back to Western Zhou (ca. 1100-771 BCE) . . . but until a draft of Great Qing
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Another explanation for Shaozheng Mao's execution is that Confucius
was furious after discovering that his students had left him for
Shaozheng Mao."' If this account were true, it would have been the first
unfair competition case in Chinese legal history.
b. Confucius : The Eternal Patriarch
At the end of his life, Confucius marveled, "[e]verything passes on
like the river . . . [d]ay and night, it never ceases."195 He may have
regretted that he could not accomplish his ideals before his passing.
However, he failed to see the enduring legacy he left behind -a
perpetual institutional framework that has been governing one-quarter of
the world that persists today. Metaphysically, the river that he referred to
may have never come back, but the track of the river that meandered
through the Chinese souls remains eternal.
Confucius did not consider himself a god.196 He did not even believe
that he could create a new idea, not to mention a world.197 As he saw it,
he was a mere transmitter through which the Duke of Zhou's ideals were
carried.19' He had no intent to be a theorist or a deity.199 Brought up by
Criminal Procedure Code was finished in 1910, there had never been a separate criminal
procedure law in Imperial China."). A lawyer sent a SOS message from his hideout place
in April 8, 2004 stating: "We [lawyers] strictly obeyed the relevant laws, rules and
regulations, not even taking half a step to the bombing area [meaning politically sensitive
area of law], but now the result it that one of us is in jail and the other is fleeing." Id. at
44-45.
194. CHIN, supra note 17, at 155.
195. Id. at 181.
196. CONFUCrUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 39 ("XIX. The Master said, 'I am
not one who was born in the possession of knowledge; I am one who is fond of antiquity,
and earnest in seeking it there."'); Id. (XX. The subjects on which the Master did not
talk, were-extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, and spiritual beings."). See
also id. at 41 ("XXXIII. The Master said, 'The sage and the man of perfect virtue; -how
dare I rank myself with them? It may say simply be said of me, that I strive to become
such without satiety, and teach others without weariness. "').
197. CHIN, supra note 17, at 149 ("Confucius told others that he was a transmitter,
not an innovator....").
198. Id. at 167. ("Confucius told others that he was a transmitter, not an
innovator-that he 'was
found of antiquity and had faith in it.').
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his mother alone, which was extremely rare in his time, he witnessed the
sufferings of his class.2 ' As an ordinary person, he strived to climb the
social ladder to be above the commoners.1 Confucius studied Chinese
classics hoping one day to become a counselor in a royal court.2 2 This
was reflected in his work in politics where he dedicated himself to
understanding the rules and procedures to properly instruct the rulers in
order to fulfill his mission to rejuvenate the glory the Duke of Zhou once
experienced.2 3 In fact, he did succeed in politics as a minister of
justice.2°1 When he found politics did not work for him, he devoted
himself to teaching students and editing the classics.25  Unlike other
religious founders, Confucius's focus was solely on the past and present,
not at all on the future.26 He firmly believed that the present should be
exactly like the past.20 7 Confucius had no intent to establish a religion,
but the proper rule of conduct he vigorously advocated has regulated the
behaviors of a large swath of the world population for two millennia.20 8
In a sense, Confucius is an accidental divinity, whose future was the past.
199. CONFUCIUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 37 (. The Master said, 'A
transmitter and not a maker, believing in and loving the ancients, I venture to compare
myself with our old P'ang. "').
200. Id. at 47 ("[W]hen I was young, my condition was low, and therefore I
acquired my ability in many things, but they were mean matters. Must the superior man
have such variety of ability? He does not need variety of ability.").
201. See Sun Jingtan ( tVjvRL), Kongzi de Jiating Chushen Wenti Xintan (JL #/
~/~Jd [New Studies of Confucius's Family Background], ZHONGGONG
NANJING SHIWEi DANGXIAO NANJING SHI XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. OF NANJING
PARTY INST. OF CPC & NANJIG ADMIN. INST.] 2015, at 83.
202. Wen, supra note 28, at 164-165.
203. CHIN, supra note 17, at 166.
204. Id. at 26.
205. See id. at 161-171.
206. See id. at 167.
207. See id.
208. Larry A. Samovar et al., Communication Between Cultures 146 (2010); C.K.
YANG, RELIGION IN CHINESE SOCIETY: A STUDIES OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL FUNCTIONS
OF RELIGION AND SOME OF THEIR HISTORICAL FACTORS 244 (1961).
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5. LET A HUNDRED SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT CONTEND
During Confucius's time,2°9 the rising of independent states reduced
the Zhou Dynasty to only a symbolic figurehead with its power confined
to the capital.210 With diminishing control from the central government,
states competed for territories, resources and influence.211 Either for
survival or expansion, each state felt an urgent need to recruit deep-
thinkers to help it gain a competitive edge over its rivals.212 The intense
demand for new ideas stimulated the supply of unique talents. Like
Confucius, other great thinkers were devoted to constructing innovative
theories.2 13  More importantly, the unfettered discourse among the
thinkers enriched their thoughts and sharpened their views. It was an
unprecedented golden age in Chinese history for the market of ideas to
flourish.2 14 Thanks to this rare window of freedom, hundreds of schools
of thought emerged to contend in an open arena.15 It is paradoxical that
Confucius's dream was to return to Zhou's glory when the King was in
control of every aspect of society, which would have rendered his free-
thinking impossible. As a result, Confucius might not regret that he did
not live to see his thoughts adopted as the official ideology. An official
endorsement was not necessarily based on merit, but on whether a school
of thought was suitable to the ruler's taste. In that regard, Confucianism
prevailed.16
a. Confucianism
The core concept of Confucianism is Li, or rules of conduct, which
has been subject to a wide range of explanations.2 17 Generally, Li had two
meanings: first, it meant rites-a set of protocols the Zhou Kings
209. The time of Confucius is often referred to as the Spring and Autumn and
Warring States Period (771 B.C.-221 B.C.). See The Warring States Period, supra note
130.
210. J.A.G. ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 11.
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followed in performing sacrificial offerings to spirit and ancestors.2 18 It
also included rules for conducting traditional ceremonial functions, such
as weddings, funerals, and official ceremonies)19 Second, Li meant rules
of proper conduct (propriety).220 Confucians maintained that "[i]f
[people] be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by the
rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will
become good.,221 Li was also used to distinguish the superior from the
inferior and the noble from the humble.22 By observing Li, no one would
deviate from his place on the social ladder, and society would be in peace
and order.23 Through studying history, Confucius concluded that when
the Emperor, not his subjects, determined state affairs, his reign would
maintain its prosperity and longevity.2 24 However, if inferiors acted
against the Emperor, the State would not survive more than a few
generations. 225
Another key concept in Confucianism is Ren (love or benevolence),
which is the basic principle concerning various social relations.
2 26
Within a family, a father should be benevolent, sons filial, elder brothers
fraternal, and younger brothers subordinate 227 In the government, "[a]
prince should employ his minister according to the rule of propriety;
ministers should serve their prince with faithfulness.22 8 When dealing
with others, the guiding principle should be "not to do to others as you
would not wish done to yourself. 229  "[T]he man of perfect virtue,
wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing
to [grow] himself, he seeks also to [grow] others.230
Confucius believed that coercive means, such as law and punishment,
were unnecessary because social order would be maintained by Li and
218. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 19.
219. CH'u, supra note 22, at 230-31 n. 11.
220. Id.
221. CONFUCrUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 16.
222. Ch'ti, supra note 2222, at 233.
223. Id.
224. CHIN, supra note 17, at 42.
225. Id.
226. MA, supra note 59, at 86.
227. Id.
228. CONFUCrUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 25.
229. Id. at 115.
230. Id. at 58.
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Ren.231 In an ideal society, there should be no need for litigation.32
Confucius explained that " [i]f people be led by laws ... they will try to
avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. 'If they be led by
virtue ... they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become
good. "233
Nevertheless, under some special circumstances, Confucius did not
completely negate the role of law and punishment.2 34 For example, the
Duke of Zheng advised his successor to take a strong approach in
combating crimes, but his successor, Taishu, did not heed the advice.
2 35
As a result, a great number of thieves stole from local people.2 36 Taishu
regretted his lenient approach and decided to use force to eliminate the
criminals. During a battle, government troops killed all of the
criminals.2 37  Upon hearing the news, Confucius238 praised Taishu and
explained why harsh laws were necessary in this instance:
When the [government] is mild, the people despise it. When they
despise it, severity must take its place. When the [government] is
severe, the people are slaughtered. When this takes place, they must be
dealt with mildly. Mildness serves to temper severity, and severity to
regulate mildness; -it is in this way that the administration of
government is brought to harmony.23 9
While Li and Ren were superior to the law, they could not completely
replace it. Confucius cautioned that law must only be used
proportionately to deal with crimes and maintain social order.40
231. Gouji Qin, The Thinking Way of Confucianism and the Rule of Law, 1 J. POL.
& L. 68, 68-69 (2008).
232. CONFUCrUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 121. ("The Master said, '[i]n hearing
litigations, I am like any other body. What is necessary, however, is to cause the people
to have no litigations.').
233. Id. at 10.
234. CHUNQIU ZHUOZHUAN (3)(i{f) [SPRING AND AUTUMN ANNALS WITH THE
COMMENTARY OF ZUO] (University of Washington Press 2017). See also MA, supra note
59, at 95-96.
235. See CIHUNQIJ ZHUOZHUAN, supra note 234, at 95-96.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. Id. (noting that Confucius was referred to as "Zhongni").
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Disproportional use of the law would lead the people to resent the
241government.
b. Legalism
Contrary to Confucianism, the Legalists ardently advocated for the
law.242 The Legalists were not concerned about protecting human rights
or limiting indulgence of the ruler; instead, they believed that the law
was the most efficient tool to create a formidable "political and military
apparatus.,243 Therefore, it is important to know that the "law" that the
Legalists promoted is not the same as the "rule of law" in the West that
protects human rights.2 44 "Law" is merely a convenient tool for the ruler
to maintain social order. Even though the Legalists believed in equality
before the law, the ruler was above the law.245
During the Warring States period,246 each individual state looked to
overpower its rivals and unify China.2 47  To achieve this goal, the
Legalists suggested that a ruler should promulgate stern punishments for
even small offenses.2 48 They believed that most people were born selfish
and greedy and could not be induced to behave by good virtue alone as
Confucians assumed.2 49 Fearing severe punishments, the people would
do as the State desired.2 5' The Legalists downplayed the cruelty that the
law would bring by arguing that enforcing the seemingly harsh rules may
never be needed because their mere existence would suffice to deter
violations.251 "When punishments are heavy, the people dare not
transgress, and therefore there will be no punishments.252
241. See id. at 95 (discussing that virtuous politics is to avoid tyranny from rulers).
242. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 18.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. MA, supra note 59, at 105.
246. See generally Leigh K. Jenco, "Rule by Man " and "Rule by Law in Early
Republican China: Contributions to a Theoretical Debate, 69 J ASIAN STUD. 181, 181
(2010).
247. Id.
248. MA, supra note 59, at 110.
249. Id. at 109.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 110.
252. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 26.
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In addition, the Legalists believed that these harsh laws must be
accompanied by a reward system.2 53  This is consistent with their
underlying assumption that most people would naturally seek profit and
avoid punishment.2 54  Regardless, an award system would create an
incentive for people to follow the ruler's orders. In the long run, the
combination of reward and punishment would reduce the size of the
government and prevent social disorder.55 Legalists believed that when
a system of law was in place, individual capabilities became less
relevant.56 By relying on laws, even an incapable ruler could govern the
state efficiently. 57
Even though Legalism did not have the same influence as
Confucianism, several of its unique features are still relevant today. First,
the Legalists believed in uniformity before the law.25' Except for the
ruler himself, everyone should be subject to the same legal punishment
for violating the law.259 Even the feudal lords must be subjected to the
same rules to ensure uniformity in enforcing the law. The Lord of Shang
concisely explained the meaning of equality before the law:
What I mean by the unification of punishments is that punishments
should know no degree or grade, but that from ministers of state and
generals down to great officers and ordinary folk, whosoever does not
obey the king's commands, violates the interdicts of the state, or rebels
against the statutes fixed by the ruler, should be guilty of death and
should not be pardoned.260
Han Fei tzu agreed that "[t]he law does not favor the nobles ....
However, the law is applied, the wise have no way of avoiding
[punishment] .... To punish a fault does not exempt the great officials.
To award merit does not exclude the commoners. "261
253. MA, supra note 59, at 110.
254. Id. at 118.
255. See id. at 109-110.
256. See id.
257. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 24.
258. Id. at 25.
259. Id. at 25.
260. CH'U, supra note 22, at 243.
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Only the short-lived Qin Dynasty abided by this principle.62 After its
demise, the principle of equality before the law faded in subsequent
dynasties )63 It was not until the fall of the last dynasty that it resurfaced
to become a noble goal for revolutionaries.
264
Second, the law should be clear. To achieve efficiency and stability,
the Legalists emphasized that the consequences of breaking the law must
be well-defined and universally known.65 Thus, the government must
issue unambiguous laws, openly announce them, and enforce them
consistently.266 By doing so, the government would send a clear message
to the people as to what conduct was not permissible.67 After Qin,
subsequent dynasties went to great lengths to preserve and enact clear
legal codes. 268 The Tang Code served as a model of precision and clarity
for all the subsequent dynasties.
269
Third, in order to smoothly administer the system of punishment, it
was crucial for the ruler to delegate the power of enforcing the law to
officials. In doing so, however, there was a risk that the officials may
not enforce the law consistently and uniformly 70 To avoid this result,
the Legalists suggested that the ruler should either reward or punish the
officials depending on whether they applied the law according to the
responsibilities required by their positions.2 71 The rules for these awards
and punishments must be equally clear so that the officials knew exactly
what to follow. While this system ensured uniform application of the
law, it did not leave any room for officials to inject their own creativity
in solving complex cases. One commentator pointed out that this system
262. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 27 (noted as another common name
"Ch'in" in the book) ("Yet the Legalist triumph was amazingly short-lived.").
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264. See Jenco, supra note 246, at 181.
265. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 26.
266. See id. at 25.
267. See id.
268. See generally THE GREAT QING CODE, supra note 69; THE T'ANG
CODE, supra note 69.
269. See Zhangsun Wuji, Selections from The Great Tang Code: Article 6, "The
Ten Abominations"
http://afe.easia.colufnbia.edu/ps/cup/zhangsun wuji great tangcode.pdf (last visited
Feb. 11, 2020).
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effectively created an "impregnable bafrier to the growth and application
of forensic genius.
Fourth, people should be held responsible as a group. The Legalists
believed that the government should endorse group accountability
because people were inherently bad.273  They recommended the
government divide the entire state population into small groups of five to
ten families. 274 Within the group, if one individual violated a law, every
member was punished for the offense.275 Therefore, each member of the
group was held responsible for preventing any transgressions against the
state.
In the Han Dynasty, an offender who committed heinous crimes or
demonstrated impiety was punishable by being cut in half at the waist.
276
In addition, the offender's parents, spouse, children, and siblings were all
publicly executed.277
Group responsibility had a long-lasting impact on the Chinese legal
system-since Qin, dynasties used various methods of collective
responsibility to maintain social order. For example, the first Han
Dynasty's legal codes provided that if an individual committed one of
the serious crimes, especially against the State, the State would not only
execute the offender, but also "three lines of the offender's families,
including both parent's families, the offender's brothers' families, and
the offender's wife's families., 278 Other dynasties extended the penalty
to "five lines of the offender by including his uncles' families and sisters'
families." 279 Even though later dynasties reduced the execution to exile,
this collective punishment method was commonly implemented until the
end of the Imperialism period in China.8
272. Ernest Alabaster, NOTES AND COMMENTARIES ON CHINESE CRIMINAL LAW
LXIII (Andesite Press 2015) (1899).
273. MA, supra note 59, at 108-09.
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278. XN REN, TRADITION OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE TRADITION 41 (1997). See
also MARK CSIKSZENTMIHALYI (ED.), READINGS IN HAN CHINESE THOUGHT 46 n. 28
(2006).
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c. Burning Books and Burying Scholars Alive
Through a series of reforms, the Legalists helped Qin build a strong
State with ruthless efficiency. As a result, the State of Qin quashed all
other rival states, unified China and established the first Dynasty in 221
B.C.28 1 Qin Shi Huang, who claimed himself as the First Emperor of
China, carried out a series of reforms and campaigns to strengthen his
authority.282 He wholeheartedly endorsed the Legalist principles for his
dynasty. In 213 B.C., with the approval of the First Emperor, Prime
Minister Li Si instigated the infamous "Burning Books and Burying the
Scholars Alive" campaign to root out non-Legalist ideas.283
To justify his campaign, Minister Li argued that Emperor Qin should
ban outdated laws made by ancient rulers because the change of
circumstances made them inapplicable in Qin.284 Even though hundreds
of schools of thought had once contributed to the nation-building in other
states, they became meaningless to Qin, who accomplished unification
solely by relying on Legalism.285 Minister Li praised the First Emperor
for setting an exemplary precedent of creating his own laws rather than
following tradition.
286
Minister Li further argued that the non-Legalist scholars, in fact,
posed a grave threat to the current regime because they often criticized
Qin's policies by invoking classical teachings.287 Some officials lauded
the First Emperor at the royal court but slandered Qin's policies when
they privately convened.288 It was extremely dangerous for Qin to allow
non-Legalist scholars to speak their minds freely because they could
form an opposition and undermine the First Emperor's authority.28 9 The
First Emperor should be the only authority in deciding right and
281. See Wen, supra note 28, at 235.
282. See id. at 254-55.
283. See id. at 253-55.
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wrong.29 Therefore, the government had to take draconian measures to
eliminate the influence of non-Legalist scholars291
The Legalists convinced the First Emperor that military aggression
would merely conquer rival states' territories, but not the people's minds.
To achieve true unity, the First Emperor needed to eradicate dissenting
literature and scholars.92 Punishing people who disobeyed was the most
efficient means to unify people's thoughts.93 Scholars who survived the
brutal campaign would certainly remold themselves to abide by Qin's
rules. As an old Chinese saying goes: "Killing a chicken to scare
monkeys." Legalists maintained that the government must preemptively
suppress dissent.294 As a result, Minister Li promulgated the following
laws:
1. Except for Qin's, all historical records of other states shall be
burned.
2. Except for the official scholars who work for the Qin Dynasty,
anyone in China who possesses copies of the Classic of Poetry, the
Classic of History, or the writings of the hundred schools of thought
shall surrender them to the local governors for burning.
3. Anyone who discusses the Classic of Poetry or the Classic of
History privately in small groups shall be publicly executed.
4. Anyone who caricatures Qin's present policies by quoting the
classics shall have his family executed.
5. Officials who have failed to report a violation of the above rules are
equally guilty.
290. See id.
291. FUNG Yu-LAN, supra note 23, at 204 ("[T]he world was scattered and in
confusion .... Men valued what they have themselves privately studied, thus casting into
disrepute what their superiors had established. At present, Your Majesty has united the
world .... Yet there are those who with their private teachings mutually abet each other,
and discredit the institutions of laws and institutions .... If such conditions are not
prohibited, the imperial power will decline above and partisanships will for below.").
292. See Wen, supra note 28, at 254-55.
293. See id.
294. See id.
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6. After thirty days of this announcement, those who have failed to
burn the books shall be defaced with dark ink and banished to labor
camps, where they will defend Qin by day and build the Great Wall by
night.
7. Books on medicine, divination, agriculture, and forestry are
exempted from burning.
8. Anyone interested in the law shall only learn from Qin's officials,
not from historical or other sources.215
The government mercilessly enforced these laws. Between 213 B.C.
and 212 B.C., the Qin government burned all non-Legalist literature that
it could find and executed 460 scholars by burying them alive for
violation of Li's laws.
296
The "Burning Books and Burying the Scholars Alive" campaign
enabled the First Emperor to consolidate power. However, the
horrendous atrocities that Qin committed upon Confucian scholars and
traditional culture galvanized resentment against the inhumane rules
across the new country.297 Historians postulate that the brutal campaign
hastened Qin's demise.29 After the death of the First Emperor in 210
B.C., the State of Qin quickly dissolved into rebellion and chaos.299
With the fall of Qin, Legalism lost its dominance in the ideological
contest with Confucianism for the rest of China's long history.
However, the chilling effect of the brutal campaign ot only traumatized
scholars during the Qin Dynasty, but all intellectuals for centuries to
come. In 1958, Mao Zedong commented on the "Burning Books and
Burying the Scholars Alive" campaign as stating:
Was it impressive for what First Emperor did? He only buried 468
Confucian scholars, but we buried 46,000 [anti-revolutionary scholars
during the revolution]. We have debated with the Democrats over the
justification of the mass executions. They blamed us for being as cruel
295. See id. The author has translated and summarized the provisions in Minister
Li Si's proposed law, which was approved by the first Emperor.
296. See Carrie Gracie, Qin Shi Huang: The Ruthless Emperor Who Burned
Books, BBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19922863.
297. MA, supra note 59, at 135.
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as the First Emperor. They were wrong. We were 100 times as cruel as
the First Emperor. The Democrats likened us to either the First Emperor
or dictator. Yes, we absolutely accept that. Unfortunately, what they
accused of us is not enough. We must supplement heir argument. (Mao
laughed.)00
d. Taoism as Transition
The fall of Qin did not send China back into a prolonged period of
warring states. Among competing rebel forces, Liu Bang quickly
consolidated power, and established the Han Dynasty in 202 BC. 301
Mindful of how the brutal punishments brought down the first dynasty,
the Han Emperor commanded his advisors to study the root causes of
Qin's quick demise from an almighty empire to rubble and identify what
Han could do to avoid the same fate.30 2
Drawing ideas from the classics, the Emperor's trusted counselors
urged the government to follow the wisdom of Taoism, a non-action
approach, relying on upright rules of nature to allow the people
themselves to work out conflicts in society.3 3 After persistent wars,
cruel oppression, and the chaotic reign of the short-lived Qin, both the
ruler and the people longed for peace and prosperity, a desire that
Taoism could meet.304 Chapter 57 of Tao De Jing captured the basic
tenets of Taoism:
The country must be based on the upright rules,
Just like deploying troops with unconventional tactics.
Those who refrain from assertive actions will win the world ....
300. Sun Yancheng, 1958 Nian Mao Zhuxi Daxiao, Ma Women Shi Qinshihuang,
Women Vigai Chengren (1958 i : qfi?117z , fi/i7-1f4X) [In
1958, Chairman Mao Laughed and Admitted CPC is the First Emperor of Qin.], 50-58
in LISHI XUEJIA CHAZUO ) [TEAHOUSE FOR HISTORIANS] (Zhaocheng
Wang (TAL)A) et al. eds. 2009)).
301. ZHONGGUO FAZHI SHI (I'[ J4 ) [THE LEGAL HISTORY OF CHINA] 73
(Xianyi Zeng (M S/) et al. eds., 5th ed. 2016).
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The more prohibitions there are, the more destitute the people will be;
The deadlier weapons the people possess, the more chaotic the world
will be;
The more trickery the people engage in, the more bizarre the society
will be;
The more laws there are, the more flourishing the robbers and thieves
will become.
Therefore, the sage says:
I take no action, and the people transform themselves;
I stay quiet, and the people correct themselves;
I refrain from interfering with the people, and they improve themselves;
I have no desires, and the people return to primitive simplicity.30 5
Taoism is different from both Confucianism, which emphasized the
leading role of the government to educate the people with virtues, and
Legalism, which advocated for harsh punishments.3 6  A Taoist
government should do nothing but let nature run its course.3 7  Any
interference by the government would upset the balance of Tao, the rule
of nature and thus hurt the people. Taoism is a Chinese version of
laissez-faire.8
Taoism reached its peak during the first seventy years of the Han
Dynasty.3 9 During this period, the Emperor made it his priority to
abolish Qin's harsh rules.31" This was exemplified in several ways. First,
the Han government substantially reduced criminal penalties and made
the law clear and understandable to ordinary people.311  During Qin's
305. LAOZI ( - ), LAOZI DAODE J1NG ZHU JIAO SHI ( _) [T-r
BOOK OF TAO AND ITS VIRTUE ANNOTATED] 149-50 (Bi Wang (TN) & Yulie Lou (tk
gI) eds., 2008).
306. See infra Sections 5 (a)-(b).
307. MA, supra note 59, at 138.
308. See generally Ken McCormick, The Tao of Laissez-Faire, 25 E. ECON. J. 331,
334-35 (1999).
309. MA, supra note 59, at 141.
310. Id.
311. Id.at 138-39.
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time, because there were too many laws backed by brutal punishments,
the people often broke the laws unknowingly.312 The disproportional
punishments aroused public anger and distrust.313 Therefore, it was
necessary not only to simplify the laws but also reduce the
punishments.34 For example, the Han government repealed collective
penalties, penalties for slander, and cruel punishments, such as limb
cutting, and various other cruel forms of the death penalty.31 5
Additionally, the early Han government substantially reduced taxes for
peasants.1 6  Moreover, the most importantly, the government
emphasized that they would rather acquit a guilty person than convict an
innocent one.317 If any doubt of guilt existed, a person would not be
subject to the death penalty.318
The Taoist approach helped the early Han overcome insurmountable
challenges in the first seventy years of the empire. The shattered
economy recovered, the living standards improved, and the people
enjoyed unprecedented peace and stability.39 The economic prosperity
made the central government more self-assured and less dependent on
local lords to maintain social order.32' However, the Emperor disliked
the hands-off approach advocated by Taoists because it limited the
central government's ability to take control of the local affairs dominated
by their native lords.32 In addition, the hands-off policy hampered the
central government's ability to collect taxes from local people.322 As a
result, the new Han Emperor began doubting whether Taoism was the
right ideology for the dynasty.323 Essentially, Taoism was probably
better suited for a federal or confederal style government, but definitely
not for the Han, which had the same ambition of building a centralized,
top-down empire as that of Qin's.
312. Id. at 140.
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e. Confucianism as the Official Ideology
During Emperor Wu of Han Han Wudi's reign, Han abandoned
Taoism and endorsed Confucianism as the official ideology.3 24  In
addition, he eliminated other schools of thought.25  By this time,
traditional Confucianism had evolved into an extremely wide-ranging
ideology that borrowed heavily from the classics, including Legalism.
3 26
6. THE CORE VALUE OF CONFUCIANISM: INEQUALITY
The notion of equality before the law never developed in traditional
China.3 27 Confucianism claimed that men were endowed with different
levels of intelligence and virtues.328 Therefore, the intelligent ones, "big
men" or "gentlemen," were better suited for mental work-to acquire
virtues, gain knowledge, and govern other people.3 29  According to
Confucius, those without intelligence were destined to do physical labor
serving the ruling class.33 Mencius summed up the relationship between
gentlemen and laborers as follows:
Great men [gentlemen] have their proper business, and little men have
their proper business . .. [s]ome who labor with their minds, and some
labor with their strength. Those who labor with their minds govern
others; those who labor with their strength are governed by others.
Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern
others are supported by them. This is a principle universally recognized.
331
According to Confucianism, the foundation of good governance was
Li, a hierarchical social order derived from family relationships.33 2 When
the Duke of Qi asked Confucius to define a good government, he replied,
"[Government excels] when the prince is prince, and the minister is
324. MA, supra note 59, at 142.
325. FUNGYu-LAN, supra note 23, at 191.
326. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 28.
327. Geoffrey MacCormack, The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law 5-6 (1996).
See also XIN REN, supra note 278, at 39; CH'U, supra note 22, at 226.
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minister; when the father is father, and the son is son. 333 He meant that
when each member of the population remained in one's own position and
faithfully carried out his or her assigned duties, then society was
harmonious .33
Xunzi (Hsuntze), a prominent Confucian, took the defense of
inequality to a new level. He argued that inequality in social status was
the fundamental nature of the world. 3 Unity and social harmony could
only be achieved when people were unequal.336 The principle of
inequality made the inferior willing to work for the superior. Equality,
however, would create confusion and cause chaos because it discouraged
people from obeying orders while serving the superior.331 People of
equal social status could not serve each other, obey each other's orders,
or provide each other resources.338
Furthermore, Xunzi argued that if everyone desired the same thing,
there would not be enough reserves left for the superior since the
resources in the world were so limited.339 In the world of inequality, the
inferior would learn to control their desires to ensure that the superior
would have sufficient assets to live a life befitting of his high social
status.340 If everyone equally pursued the same goods, there would not
only be a shortage of supply but also a disorder that threatened social
harmony.341 A world in disorder would then lead to poverty. 34 2 Xunzi
cited the sage's saying to support his argument: "They are only uniform
in that they are not uniform. 3 43 While Confucians generally disdained
commerce and wealth, Xunzi was probably the first economics-minded
defender of inequality.
333. See CONFUCIUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 256.
334. CH'U, supra 22, at 230 ("A society in which honorableness and humbleness,
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various features was extremely repugnant to the Confucianists.").
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7. THE CONFUCIANIZATION OF LAW344
Since the core of Confucianism was inequality, the Confucian-
inspired laws offered the protection of inequality as the top priority to
ensure that the royal family members, officials, and nobles were not
subject to the same punishments prescribed in the criminal code as would
a commoner.345  Throughout the imperial history, the differential
treatment of the privileged and nobles remained the most important
provision in the law codes until the last dynasty.
346
Article 7 of the Tang Code provided special treatment to eight
categories of people who enjoyed higher social status than commoners
because of royal connections either by blood or marriage, high virtue and
learning, or distinguished service to the dynasty.347 The justification for
the differential treatment came from the Rites of Zhou: 348 "Punishments
do not extend up to the great officers. If they commit offenses, they are
judged under the eight deliberations, and the weight of the sentence is
not governed by the books of punishment."
349
Under Article 7, persons who were subject to special deliberations
were:
1. The relatives of the emperor: this category extends to the fifth
degree of the Emperor's blood relatives, as far as to the brothers of
Emperor's paternal great-great-grandfather and their descendants, as
well as the Emperor's paternal grandmother's and his mother's
relatives up to the fifth-degree.
351
2. The old retainers of the Emperor: this category refers to those who
have served the Emperor for a long period of time. The Qing Code also
344. This term was first used by Professor Ch'ti. See CH'U, supra note 22, at 267.
345. CH'U, supra note 22, at 278 ("The noble and the mean were subject to
different punishments, and the officials were permitted to use their rank to cancel their
punishments.").
346. See generally THE T'ANG CODE, supra note 69; TE GREAT QING
CODE, supra note 69.
347. THE T'ANG CODE, supra note 69, at 83.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 84.
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required that the servant had ready access to the Emperor and received
the Emperor's special favor.351
3. Persons of high moral character: this includes those of great
learning and virtue, also called worthy men or gentlemen. Their
virtuous words and action set an example for the entire country to
emulate. 352
4. Persons of great talent: this category includes military leaders, state
counselors, and managers, whose exemplary deeds improve human
relations.35 3
5. Persons of great achievement and glory: this refers to decorated
national heroes and strategists upon whom the Emperor depends to lead
the army, build alliances, and maintain peace and prosperity in the
country.
354
6. Persons of high position in the government: this category includes
active duty official[s] of the third rank or above and nobilities of the
first rank.
355
7. Persons of great diligence in their work: this category includes
military and civil officials who served the country in remote areas
under difficult circumstances. 356
8. Guests of the state: this category includes the descendants of the
proceeding dynasties who have been received as guests.
35 7
Closely following the Tang Code, the Qing Code prescribed
privileges in Article 3, entitled: the "Eight [Categories of Persons Whose
Cases are to be Especially] Considered."358 The categories of persons
who were entitled to special deliberation remained the same as provided







358. Id. at 36.
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in Article 7 of the Tang Code, only with minor changes to the orders of
the categories.
[Article 3] is a provision whereby the nation treats with special favour
relatives of the Emperor, the virtuous, the industrious, and those of long
service, who must be treated outside the law, with forgiveness.
Therefore, when they have committed offenses, the decision will be
prepared and considered outside the normal provisions of the law.
Thus, the persons entitled to have their cases especially considered will
be made to be conscious of their dignity and not lightly to commit
offenses.359
a. Family Relations and Criminal Penalties
Confucianist scholars in the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing dynasties
(1644-1911) condensed the social relations to Five Relations and Three
Bonds, which provided the ethical and legal grounds for the whole
society.36 Five Relations: relationships between rulers and subject,
father and son, husband and wife, younger and elder brothers, and friend
and friend.361 The first three were called three bonds, which were the
most important relationships for the family and society in ancient
China.362
Furthermore, the scholars developed mourning regulations based on
family relations between a mourner and the deceased.363 There were five
categories or grades of genealogical distance, each of which required
distinctive clothing that a mourner must wear during the mourning
period.364 The closer the genealogical distance the mourner was from the
deceased, the more demonstrative the clothing would be and the longer
the mourner was obligated to grieve.365 The impact of mourning
regulations went far beyond conducting mourning rituals. In fact, the
359. Id. at 36 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
360. See MACCORMACK, supra note 327, at 73.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. David Jordan, Wufu if The Traditional Chinese Mourning Categories,
https://pages.ucsd.edu/-dkjordan/chin/MoumingGrades.html (last updated Jan. 1, 2019).
364. Id.
365. Id.
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regulations delineated the duties and obligations of living members
among the family.
366
The mourning regulations served as a basis for the penal code to
weigh criminal penalties in cases involving crimes committed against
one's relatives.367 When a senior committed a crime against ajunior, the
senior was entitled to leniency.368 Conversely, if a junior injured or
killed a senior even without intent, the junior usually received severe
penalties.369 The chart below illustrates how the judiciary board applied
the mourning regulation in sentencing.
366. Id.
367. MACCORMACK, supra note 327, at 75.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 76.
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Mourning Regulations Implications on Criminal Penalty
A son mourned his parents for If a son killed his father, even
three years.7  accidentally, the son would receive
the most severe penalty.71
Parents mourned their son for only If a father intentionally killed his
one year.72  son, the father would only receive
60 blows and penal servitude for
one year.73
Parents mourned their unmarried If an unmarried daughter's immoral
daughter for one year.74  conduct caused her father to
commit suicide out of shame, the
unmarried daughter would be
sentenced to immediate death.75
The parents mourned their married If a married daughter's illicit sexual
daughter for only nine months.76  conduct caused her father to
commit suicide out of shame, the
married daughter eceived the death
penalty with delay.
A wife mourned her husband's If a wife intentionally killed her
death for three years.378  husband, she was to be sentenced to
death by slicing. If a wife
accidentally killed the husband, she
was to be sentenced from three
years of penal servitude, exile, to
immediate strangulations 
79
A husband mourned his wife for If a husband intentionally killed his
only one year.80  wife, the husband was to be
370. Id. at 75.
371. Id. at 79.
372. Id. at 75.
373. Id. at 79.
374. Id. at 75.
375. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 359-60.
376. MACCORMACK, supra note 327, at 75.
377. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 359-362.
378. MACCORMACK, supra note 327, at 75.
379. Id. at 92.
380. Id. at 75.
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Killing a parent was the most heinous crime which was punished by
the most severe penalty.382 In such cases, the court did not differentiate
between killing intentionally or by mistake.383 To show mercy, the
Emperor occasionally considered extenuating circumstances, but he
usually merely changed the sentence to a more humane form of
execution.384 The law focused on the fact of a parent's death, but not
always on the reason for the death. The following cases illustrate how
offenders were punished under the Qing Codes.
b. The Case of Jao (Mother Ordered Son to Purchase Poison for
Her Suicide.)"38
The case of Jao demonstrated how the principle of filial piety could
place a junior member of the family in an impossible situation.3 6 After
being harassed by a creditor, Mrs. Jao decided to commit suicide so that
she could incriminate the creditor for her death. To accomplish her plan,
Jao ordered her son to buy poison. For the son, if he resisted his
mother's order, he would commit the crime of impiety. Following his
mother's order meant that he would assist in killing his mother, which
was the most heinous crime.387 After failing to persuade Jao to give up
her plan, the son bought the poison. With the poison in his hand, the son
381. Id. at 92-93.
382. Id. at 79.
383. CH'U, supra 22, at 47.
384. MACCORMACK, supra note 327, at 80.
385. See id. at 82-83.
386. Id.
387. Id.
sentenced to strangulation after the
assizes (meaning that it was
possible for the sentence to be
reduced.) If the husband
accidentally killed his wife, there
was no penalty.381
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continued to advise her not to commit suicide. But Jao snatched the
poison, swallowed it, and died.388
The provincial court applied the law of plotting to kill a parent by
analogy and sentenced the son to death by slicing, the most severe form
of the death penalty.389 In rejecting the sentence, the Board reasoned that
the son did not have the intent to kill his mother.39" He had no choice but
to obey his mother's order to obtain the poison.391 For the authorities,
however, the lack of intent was not enough to change the matricidal
nature of the case. With the approval of the Emperor, the Board reduced
the provincial court's sentence to death by immediate beheading, a less
severe form of the death penalty.
392
c. The Case of Chen nde Chang (Married Daughter's Obligation
to Her Parents) 3 3
Mrs. Chen nde Chang committed adultery with a man who later
abducted her.394 Out of shame and indignation, Chen's father committed
suicide.395 The governor of Henan sentenced Chen to strangulation after
assizes (death penalty with a delay for possible commutation) and
referred the case to the Imperial Board in Beijing for review.396 There
were two provisions of the Qing Code, which dealt with parents' suicide
caused by their offspring's adultery: if an unmarried daughter's illicit
sexual relationship with a man caused her father to commit suicide out of
shame and indignation, the unmarried daughter would face immediate
strangulation (death penalty without delay).397 However, if a married
daughter caused her father to commit suicide for the same reason, she
would face a reduced sentence-strangulation after assizes (death
penalty with delay, with a possibility of commutation). 398
388. Id. at 82.




393. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 359.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 360.
396. Id. at 360-61.
397. Id.
398. Id.
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In this case, the governor reasoned that Chen's marriage made her no
longer a member of her parents' family.399 Since the bond between Chen
and her biological father weakened after the marriage, the legal penalties
should also be changed accordingly. Therefore, Chen should receive the
death penalty with delay, rather than immediate death. The Imperial
Board affirmed the governor's decision."' Bodde and Morris offered
additional support for the governor's analysis."1 First, the mourning
regulation required a married daughter to mourn her biological parent's
death for a much shorter period than it required an unmarried daughter to
mourn.40 2  As a result, the married daughter should have "a lesser
sentence for an offense committed against" her parents.0 3 Second,
another provision of the Qing Code treated a married daughter and an
unmarried one differently in treason cases.40 4 There, a married daughter
of her father, who was guilty of treason, received no punishment even
though the father's family members, including all unmarried daughters,
were subject to extermination, i.e., death or exile.405 It seems that the law
was clear and consistent regarding the reduced legal obligation of
married daughters to their biological parents.
However, the Emperor overruled the Board's affirmation of the
governor's decision by citing the Documents of Classic (Shu Jing),
which was not in the Qing Code.406 The Emperor reasoned: "Because the
child's relationship to the parents derives from Heaven, no differentiation
in that relationship should be made with respect o a daughter simply on
the basis of whether or not she happens to be married.,407 The Board
sentenced Chen to immediate strangulation according to the Emperor's
decision.0 8
399. Id. at 360
400. Id.
401. Id. at 360-61.






408. Id. at 361-62.
[Vol. 28.3
2020] Confucius and the Chinese Legal Tradition 525
d. The Case of Chen (Daughter-In-Law's Obligation to Her
Father-In-Law) "o
Mrs. Chen did not respond to her father-in-law's call for food because
she was away from home washing clothes by the well.41 The father-in-
law was angry and attempted to beat her. In the process, the father-in-
law fell to his death.4" The Provincial Court reasoned that Mrs. Chen
did not intend to disobey her father-in-law and sentenced her to exile,
one degree reduced from the death penalty. 12 The Board affirmed the
Court's decision. When the Emperor received the case for the final
review, however, he did not agree with the reduced sentence.413 He
believed that Mrs. Chen violated filial piety by not heeding the
patriarch's call, and thus, she deserved the death penalty.414 Nonetheless,
the Emperor reduced her sentence to exile on the grounds of compassion.
Through this case, the Emperor tried to demonstrate that it was
intolerable for any breach of filial piety, but it was in his discretion to
avoid capital punishment to show mercy to his subjects.4 15 Mrs. Chen
was spared not by her lack of intent, but by the Emperor's benevolence.
e. The Case of Hsing Hai (An Official's Immunity After Killing
His Son)416
Hsing Hai was an official writer-a position he obtained by passing
the civil service examination.41 One day, Hai learned that his son had
misappropriated public funds for sacrificial services. In addition, the son
had beaten a service boy to death.418 During a private interrogation, Hai







416. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 214.
417. Id.
418. Id.
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beat his son to death.419 Without reporting the case to the government, he
secretly buried his son's body.
4 2
1
The provincial board of punishment asked the Imperial Board if Hai's
punishment could be reduced from eighty blows of the heavy bamboo to
deprivation of official status or simple payment of a fine. The
commutation request was based on Article 8 of the Qing Code, which
provided that government officials were entitled to special
deliberations .421
The punishment of eighty blows was not for Hai's killing his son, but
his failure to report the case to the authority. In the absence of applicable
provision from the code, the provincial board concluded that Hai's
killing of his son was justified because the son committed a capital
crime.122 Therefore, the remaining issue for the provincial board was
how to punish Hai for his failure to report the killing to the government.
If a commoner committed the same crime, the board would have
sentenced the commoner to eighty blows with heavy bamboo. Since Hai
was an official writer, he should receive special treatment under the law.
The provincial board did not know how much leniency Hsing Hai
deserved.
For the killing, the board contemplated two provisions of the Qing
Code: (1) if a father killed his son for disobedience, the father received
100 blows with heavy bamboo; or4 24 (2) if a father killed his child
because the child has struck or reviled the father, the father was not
guilty of the killing.425 However, the board was not ready to rely on
either of the two provisions most likely due to lack of supporting
evidence.426 So even without directly applicable law, the board ruled that





423. Id. at 214-15.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 215.
426. Id.
427. Id.
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Reviewing the decision, the Imperial Board upheld the provincial
board's decision.428 On the issue of how his corporal punishment should
be commuted, the Imperial Board reasoned: "[T]he father holds the
position of official writer, and his penalty of 80 blows is not severe
enough to call for removal from civil service, . . .he [shall] be permitted
to pay a monetary redemption.
'" 429
f. A Sense of Proportionality
Stealing objects from the Emperor's ancestral temple was a serious
crime punishable by the death penalty.43 ° Once, after catching a man for
taking a jade ring from late Emperor Kao's temple, the Commandant of
Justice (called the Minister of Justice in later dynasties) sentenced him to
public execution and referred the case to Emperor Wen for final
approval. 41  The Emperor was so furious about the man's act of
desecration that he asked the Commandant to exterminate (i.e., to kill)
the man's entire family. 4 2 Surprisingly, the Commandant declined to
follow the Emperor's recommendation, reasoning that the punishment
should be proportional to the seriousness of the crime. In this case, it
was sufficient to punish the man by public execution. The Commandant
further explained: "If for stealing objects from the ancestral temples
[y]ou would exterminate [the man's family], how would [y]ou apply this
law . . . in the extraordinary and suppositious case that somebody [dug
up the late Emperor's coffin]?, 433 The Commandant's salient analysis
recorded in 160 B.C. would certainly delight Judge Posner. In his well-
known article An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, Judge Posner had
almost the same thought:
If robbery is punished as severely as murder, the robber might as well
kill his victim to eliminate a witness. Thus, one cost of making the
428. Id. In fact, the Board did not even bother to elaborate why the king was
justifiable even though that was no applicable provision in the code. See id.
429. Id.
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punishment of a crime more severe is that it reduces the criminal's
incentive to substitute that crime for a more serious one.
434
The record did not show whether the Emperor took the
Commandant's advice. If the Emperor was as economics-minded as
Judge Posner, he should have forgiven the Commandant who spoke
against him. 435  The Commandant's fate hinged on the Emperor's
intelligence, education, and experience. So did the entire nation of China
for two millennia, because no one was allowed to be wiser than the
Emperor.
8. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
In ancient China, there was no division of power.436 At the central
level, the Judiciary Board was one of the six ministries under the
Emperor.437  The Board officials were civil servants who passed the
national exams on the Chinese classics-of which law was unlikely a
subject.438 Career clerks at the Judicial Board assisted the officials in
trying and reviewing cases.439 Beneath the central government was three
levels of governments in ascending order: the district (or the county), the
prefecture, and the provincial governments.440 Magistrates at the district,
county, and prefecture levels personally handled legal cases.441 Except
for minor cases punishable by bambooing, the magistrates had no power
to try cases.442 At the provincial level, the judiciary commission which
was separate but not independent of other departments-handled legal
cases.443  The provincial governor made the final decisions on these
cases.444 Magistrates were responsible for investigating and transferring
434. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 1193, 1207 (1985).
435. Id.
436. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 113.
437. Id. at 116.
438. Id. at 114.
439. Id. at 113.
440. ALABASTER, supra note 272, at 8.
441. Id. at 8-9.
442. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 115.
443. Id.
444. Id.
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cases to higher levels of government.445  The provincial judicial
commission was responsible for trying capital cases and other cases
punishable by exile or penal servitude.446 All death penalty cases were to
be sent to the Emperor for final review and approval.447
a. Lawyers as Litigation Tricksters
As a profession, lawyers rarely existed throughout ancient Chinese
history.448 In China's top-down political structure, the government
viewed any legal representation "as a dangerous source of trouble,,
449
which eroded the governor's sole power to administer justice.45 While
the government occasionally permitted legal representation of one's
relatives in rural areas, it generally regarded lawyers as "troublemakers
and corruptors.'"451 Therefore, the Qing Code permitted legal
representation under limited circumstances:
1. A lawyer could represent his close relative or in a case in which the
lawyer had a legitimate personal interest.
2. In ancient China, the extremely low rate of literacy made it
impossible for people in rural areas to access justice. Therefore, the
code permitted a lawyer to prepare legal documents for illiterate people
if the lawyer did not attempt to fabricate causes of action.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 116.
447. Id.
448. ALABASTER, supra note 272, at LVIII-LXI ("[T]he Chinese system does not
seem favourable to the growth of a professional class trained in the law-indeed it seems
to be the policy to discourage any such result. No counsel appear[s] in a Chinese
Court."). See also MACCORMACK, supra note 268, at 11 (" [T]he development of a legal
profession.., was actively discouraged by the state.").
449. MACCORMACK, supra note 268, at 11.
450. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 113-14 ("[T]he judicial system of
imperial China, like the governmental system as a whole, was a centralized monolith with
no division of powers."). See also THE GREAT QING CODE, supra note 69, at 6 ([A]
highly centralized government headed by an absolute ruler who ruled by means of a
bureaucracy. The primary obligation of every Chinese was to fulfil the duties assigned
him by the Emperor.").
451. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 413.
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3. If "a habitual litigation trickster[ ] who conspire[d] with
government clerks, trick[ed] ignorant country folk, or practice[d]
intimidation or fraud[," the trickster was to be punished "by military
exile at the most distant malarial regions of Yunnan or Kueichow.
4 52
In practice, however, the governor had various ways to penalize
lawyers without relying on any code provision. In a Henan case, Hsia
Fang-chueh petitioned the governor to apprehend the murderer of his
clansman, who was beyond five degrees of mourning. 53 Hsia took two
ounces of silver for the legal work from the clansman's family.4 54 The
governor held that Hsia was guilty of the illegal practice of law because
he was not legally related to the clansman.455 To be related, the clansman
had to be within five degrees of mourning, i.e., Hsia's third cousin or
closer.456
Technically, Hsia could have argued that the clansman's family
members were illiterate, and the law did not prohibit a lawyer from
receiving legal fees. 151
In sentencing, the governor did not find a code provision directly
applicable for Hsia's crime. By analogy, the governor referenced a
provision regarding habitual litigation tricksters: whoever "conspired
with [a] government clerk[ ] trick[ ] ignorant country folk, or practice
intimidation or fraud[,]" was to be sentenced to military exile to a remote
region.15' The governor sentenced Hsia to three years of penal servitude,
one degree less than the punishment for habitual litigation tricksters.459
Why did the governor mitigate the punishment from military exile to a
three-year servitude? Is it because the governor wanted to show
benevolence? Or is it because he was unsure of the legality of the
judgment? Or both? It would take another litigation trickster to find out.
To prevent legal representation, a provincial government issued an
edict warning local magistrates of vicious law practices by tricksters:
452. Id. at 413-15.
453. Id. at 414.
454. Id.
455. See id. at 414-15.
456. Id. at 414.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 415-16.
459. Id. at 416.
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[The litigation tricksters] entrap people for the sake of profit. They
fabricate empty words and heap up false charges. At their bidding,
plaintiffs are induced to bring up stupid nonsense in their accusations
whose empty falsity, when exposed at he trial, brings blame upon the
plaintiffs themselves while the litigation tricksters stand to one side.
Victims of these false accusations, once they have been dragged in,
remain entrapped and their livelihood is gone. Even should they have
the luck to be completely exonerated as a result of the trial, their
families will by then have become mined .... All these devilish doings
460certainly deserve our bitter detestation.
The edict required the magistrates to question the petitioners whether
tricksters had instigated, advised, and published their petitions.461 Once
confirmed, the magistrates must immediately arrest the tricksters.62 The
edict also requested magistrates to compare the complaints with the
petitioner's own handwriting.6 3  If the handwriting didn't match, the
magistrate must compel the petitioner to reveal the trickster's name and
apprehend the trickster.64 The magistrate must strictly investigate and
punish the trickster and treat the bonafide petitioner with leniency.
4 65
b. Death Penalty
In 63 1, the Emperor of T'ang Dynasty ordered the execution of a high
official for his defense of an insane man who uttered improper
remarks.66 Deeply regretting his order, the Emperor exclaimed: "Human
life is of the utmost importance, for once dead, a man cannot live
again. From then on, the Emperor mandated that all decisions
concerning the death penalty be reported two days in advance to the
Emperor for a final review and that no death penalty be carried out
460. Id. at 416-17.
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without the Emperor's approval.46 Emperors in the subsequent dynasties
followed the same practice.
However, the review process, which took place in autumn, "was
complex and over[-]refined; perhaps it was unduly ritualized." '469 The
Board presented the Emperor with two lists of names.47 The first list
carried the names of criminals to be executed and the second list
provided the names of those who deserved commutation. 1 The Board
wrote the first list of names on a large piece of paper with the names of
those deemed to be less guilty than others "placed either at the corners or
in the [center]. 472 Then, the Board submitted the first list to the Emperor
for review.113 The Emperor, "with a brush dipped in vermilion, [made] a
circle on it at seeming, and to some extent real, hazard, and criminals
whose names [were] traversed by the red line [were] ordered for
execution."'474 Those who luckily dodged the Emperor's red circle would
survive for another year until the next review ensued.475
9. CONCLUSION: THE APPLE DOESN'T FALL FAR FROM THE TREE.4"
Through his ingenuity and hard work, Confucius transformed and
perfected an institution for governing Chinese people, which has been
religiously replicated since 50 B.C. Confucius conjured a utopia and
prescribed a path to achieve it: when people restrained themselves and
act upon the rule of propriety, the world was in the proper order just as
experienced in the early Zhou dynasty. According to that order, the King,
at the pinnacle of the pyramid, held absolute authority; regional lords
were loyal to the King; and commoners were submissive to the
468. Id.
469. Id. at 142.
470. ALABASTER, supra note 272, at 28.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 28-29.
473. Id. at 29.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. See The Apple Doesn't Fall Far from the Tree, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY,
https ://dictionary.canbridge.org/us/dictionary/english/apple-doesn-t-fall-far-from-the-
tree (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (An English proverb, which means "a child usually has a
similar character or similar qualities to his or her parents.").
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privileged. If people acted according to their hierarchical worth assigned
by the authority, there would be peace and order.
Inequality is the core of Confucianism. Confucians claimed that men
were endowed with different levels of intelligence and virtues.
Therefore, the intelligent "gentlemen" were suited for governing those
without intelligence, who were destined to do physical labor serving the
ruling class. The central theme of the Confucian-inspired laws was the
perpetuation of inequality. According to Rites of Zhou, "[p]unishments
do not extend up to the great officers.' ,17 7 Throughout the imperial
history, the differential treatment of the privileged and nobles remained
the first provision in the legal codes.
The Communist Party of China (CPC) has had a love-hate
relationship with Confucius. Initially, Mao Zedong viewed Confucius as
a threat to Communism, and thus his followers burned Confucius's
books and desecrated his tomb. However, it proved impossible to uproot
the Confucian traditions that had been deeply ingrained in people's
minds and souls. Mao's anti-Confucius detour was only a brief hiatus in
a two-thousand-year-old tradition. With the declining influence of
Communism, President Xi has revived the Confucian tradition to
maintain the CPC's legitimacy. Under the banner of "building a Chinese
dream of national rejuvenation," China has established Confucius
Institutes throughout the world promoting Chinese values abroad and
rekindle nationalism at home. Confucius's spirit lives on. Unless the
power is decentralized and the Confucian hierarchy is rejected, the rule
of law will unlikely take root in China.
477. THE T'ANG CODE, supra note 69, at 83.
